The past decade has produced abundant comparative research with nonhuman primates on the evolutionary origins of human prosociality and the sense of fairness. Even though great apes such as chimpanzees engage in cooperative hunting and food sharing in the wild, laboratory studies have consistently found that chimpanzees do not usually provide windfall resources to partners at no cost (Silk et al., 2005) and do not understand justice as humans do (Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012) . Generally, testing procedures involve two conspecifics facing a food distribution task that may potentially trigger phenomena such as inequity aversion (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003 ; but see Engelmann, Clift, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2017) , no cost prosociality (Horner, Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011) , food sharing (Silk, Brosnan, Henrich, Lambeth, & Shapiro, 2013) , or reciprocity (Amici et al., 2014) . Bargaining games, such as the dictator (DG) and the ultimatum (UG) games (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) are particularly appealing because they combine each of these phenomena simultaneously.
In both games, a proposer splits a windfall in any way she desires with her partner. Whereas the DG recipient is passive and has to accept the proposer's offer, the UG recipient can either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, each partner receives the corresponding split, but if the offer is rejected, nobody receives anything. Because the DG recipient cannot affect the final outcome of the distribution, any nonzero offer by the proposer indicates the latter's prosocial tendency. In contrast, the proposer's offer in the UG is composed of her prosocial tendency plus her strategic estimation of what the recipients are likely to accept. When confronted with resource distribution games, humans take into account their own and their partners' prosocial tendencies and social aversions to avoid conflict. Although there are substantial cross-cultural differences (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011; Güth & Kocher, 2014; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) , human proposers make offers above zero in both games, usually higher in the UG than the DG, and human recipients often reject options smaller than 20% and sometimes even bigger than 50%. Taken together, these results contradict the rational maximizer's perspective because some humans are willing to give and reject at their own cost (Güth & Kocher, 2014) . Importantly, we use the term "rational maximizer" to indicate that when there is something to be gained, subjects take it regardless of what someone else got as a result, even if that someone was responsible for creating that choice in the first place.
Current interest in the evolutionary roots of fairness and its psychological underpinnings have led researchers to confront pairs of individuals with various social dilemmas including several versions of the UG (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Kaiser, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012; Proctor, Williamson, de Waal, & Brosnan, 2013) . Following the miniultimatum procedure developed by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) , Jensen et al. (2007) presented dyads of chimpanzees with preselected pairs of quantities (e.g., 5/5 vs. 8/2, with the first of each pair representing the proposer's allocation). The proposer could select one of the pairs by pulling a rod that brought the offer halfway. Then, the recipient accepted by pulling another rod that delivered the offer to both subjects or rejected by not pulling during 60 s, thus ending the trial without any food within reach. Kaiser and colleagues (2012) tested chimpanzees and bonobos in a procedure in which they allowed the proposers to "steal" some of the food originally allocated to the recipient before making an offer, to see whether this enhanced rejections. In both studies, proposers did not incur cost to make equal offers, whereas recipients showed no inequity aversion because they never rejected nonzero outcomes. Consequently, unlike humans, chimpanzees and bonobos behaved as rational maximizers. With regard to recipients, one argument against this conclusion was that 0-options were accepted approximately half of the time (Jensen et al., 2007) . According to some authors, chimpanzees might not have behaved as rational maximizers (Brosnan, 2013) . According to others (Henrich & Silk, 2013b) , rejecting 0-option half of the time implies responding at chance, which is compatible with rational maximizing because both accepting and rejecting leads to zero outcome. Smith and Silberberg (2010) offered an alternative explanation. They found that apes' data were reproducible in humans by increasing the delay to reject from 1 to 5 min. Namely, when humans were forced to wait 5 min (instead of 1) to reject an offer, they tended to accept anything to initiate the next trial and thus increased their likelihood of obtaining something. This means that 60 s may have been too long to wait for chimpanzees (Jensen et al., 2007) , who may have accepted 0-offers to initiate a new trial with better prospects.
Another relevant aspect for bargaining methodologies is the way proposers make offers and recipients respond to them. One solution is using token-exchange procedures to substitute the direct presence of food for an object (the token equals some distribution of food) and to emulate a physical interchange. Proctor and colleagues (2013) compared chimpanzees' responses in an UG and in a preference test using tokens, each of them allocating a different amount of food to the proposer and the recipient (5/1 vs. 3/3). Proposers selected one token, gave it to the recipient who could then either give it to a begging experimenter (accept) or keep it during the next 30 s (reject). In their preference test, proposers gave tokens directly to the experimenter while a naïve passive recipient sat in the adjacent cage. Although the authors treated this preference test as a DG, this is unwarranted because the proposer did not give anything directly to the recipient, turning it into a nonsocial game (Henrich & Silk, 2013b) . The authors found that proposers selected the 3/3 token more often in the UG than in the preference test. However, the interpretation of this result is controversial. Silk (2013a), (2013b) pointed out that the change toward 3/3 was not different from chance in two out of the three dyads. In response, Brosnan and de Waal (2014) claimed that this change of behavior between conditions reflected second-order inequity aversion because chimpanzees might have anticipated a conflict. However, because rejections never occurred and no experimental evidence for that potential anticipation was provided, this remains a mere conjecture. Pairing a prototypical DG with an UG would have been highly desirable because it would have allowed researchers to distinguish intrinsic (i.e., give) from strategic (i.e., give to receive) prosociality. Furthermore, the absence of 0-options or the inclusion of a begging human experimenter may have substantially hindered the appearance of rejections.
In sum, the evolutionary picture of fairness based on the UG remains rather ambiguous. Whereas two studies characterize ape proposers as selfish (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012) , another study characterizes them as prosocial (Proctor et al., 2013) , but in any case, whether this is based on intrinsic or strategic motivation remains unclear. Moreover, although all studies have shown that recipients accept any offers above zero, there are This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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2 different interpretations about the absence of rejections in recipients (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2013; Proctor et al., 2013) . To shed light on these different interpretations, the goal of our study is to compare chimpanzees' responses in an iterated DG/UG that manipulated the cost to the proposers and the size of the gift to recipients. Players faced each other across a table, and the proposer selected one of two food windfalls by pulling a rope that distributed it among the two players. Moreover, in the UG, the recipient could accept the proposer's choice by pulling another rope or reject it by not pulling for 15 s (Figure 1b) . We are aware that a go/no-go paradigm for rejections in UG diminishes exact comparison with UG human procedures, but the reduction of rejection time to 15 s decreases the likelihood of unmotivated refusals (Smith & Silberberg, 2010) . Two key features of our study deserve special mention. First, our ABACA design alternated between nonsocial (A) and social games (B and C represented DG or UG), a feature that allowed us to obtain a reliable estimate of the baseline tendency to select each option in the absence of a partner as well as their understanding of the game and the stability of their response. Second, we manipulated the cost for proposers and the size of the gift for the recipient. The latter allowed us to know whether proposers considered their partner's payoff in their offers and whether recipients rejected based on advantageous (rejection of high gift) or disadvantageous (rejection of low gift) inequity aversion. The inclusion of a 6/0 option measured the likelihood of rejecting when receiving nothing and served as an anchor point against which all other options were pitted (6/3, 5/3, 5/9, 6/9, see Table 1 for further information). Importantly, we are aware that using small differential ratios between quantities may produce different recipients' responses than if we had used larger diferential ratios. However, it is not only the design feasibility that justifies their use, but also the idea that only when differential rates between the rewards are small, moral emotions are activated, thus allowing us to explore whether they are present in nonhuman animals. Finally, chimpanzees played reciprocal trials (i.e., every dyad played the same condition switching roles) to see whether second-order inequity aversion or reciprocity occurred. We also scored any communicative acts (see the online supplemental materials).
Method
The Committee of Bioethics at the University of Barcelona (IRB00003099) and the ethics committee of the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center approved the study. Following international guidelines for animal welfare, all the subjects participated in a voluntary basis (the session started if the animals entered at the experimental room after calling them by their names) and we did not use invasive or harmful methods.
Participants
Six chimpanzees (four males; M age ϭ 15 years) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig Zoo (Germany) participated in the study. We tested four dyads. Even though dyads consisted of forced partner combinations, we carefully chose kin or nonkin social tolerant partners because previous studies had shown those partners to be successful in cooperation (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006; Suchak, Eppley, Campbell, & de Waal, 2014) . Two subjects (Lobo and Kofi) played twice to informally explore whether they changed their behavior depending on the partner they were playing with (see Table S1 in the online supplemental materials for detailed information upon age, sex, rearing history and previous participation in Jensen et al.'s study (Jensen et al., 2007) .
Materials
We used two similar apparatuses for the UG and DG (Figure 1 ). The DG apparatus consisted of a polyvinyl chloride table with two parallel guide rails running from the proposer's side to the recipient's side. A pair of trays located on top of each rail holding various food distributions constituted one of the options that the proposer could select by pulling a rope, so that the trays on the corresponding rail moved in opposite directions: The closest tray moved toward the proposer, and the farthest tray toward the partner. The UG apparatus was similar except that when the proposer pulled, the trays in that rail moved in opposite directions but stopped halfway to the recipient, making a piece of Velcro accessible to him, so that he could decide whether to pull to complete the movement of a) b) Figure 1 . Illustration of the apparatus for the DG (a) and UG (b) in the Condition 6/0 (background) 6/3 (foreground). The proposer is depicted on the left and the recipient on the right. In the DG, the recipient cannot reject the offer. In the UG, the recipient can respond to the offer by pulling the U-shaped rope (accept) or not (reject) once the proposer has chosen one option. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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the trays (accept) or not (after 15 s reject; for illustrative examples of acceptance and rejection, see the video in the online supplemental materials, and for further detailed information about the apparatus, see the online supplemental materials).
Food and Conditions
We used small pieces of grapes/pellets, depending on dyads' food preferences. We configured the conditions following Hanus and Call (2007) to have higher differences and lower ratios between final outcomes. Thus, we had four conditions with a default 6/0 option pitted against another option controlling for cost to be generous (in no cost conditions, the proposers could be generous with their partners for free by always earning six pieces of food, whereas in cost conditions, that would imply losing one piece of food by deciding between 6/0 and 5/x) and size of gift (in small gift conditions, the proposers could raise their partner's outcome to three pieces of food, less than their own profit [i.e., 6/0 and 6/3], whereas in large gift conditions, the partner's outcome would surpass their own [i.e., 6/0 and 6/9]). We varied some pairs of quantities between nonsocial and social games (Table 1) to test for the chimpanzees' understanding of the task. The Condition 0/0 and 0/3 increased the salience of the recipient's side, allowing us to analyze whether subjects payed attention to the consequences of their choices with respect to the payoffs on their side. The Condition 6/0 and 5/0 allowed us to ensure that subjects discriminated quantities (6 vs. 5) and the cost was significant to them.
Procedure and Design
We used an ABACA design (A ϭ training nonsocial, B/C ϭ social games). The training consisted of six conditions that were played across eight sessions of 12 trials each. We conducted the training before the social games and posttraining after each social game; therefore each subject played 24 nonsocial sessions. The state of the door was relevant during the training. The closed door did not allow the subject to gain access to the adjacent cage. Therefore, maximizing the payoff only required paying attention to the options on the subject's side (the food allocated to the other side could not be obtained). With this procedure, we could check whether subjects would preferentially choose maximizing quantities (e.g., 6/0, obtaining 6, rather than 5/3, obtaining 5, see Door close conditions in Table 1 ). The open door allowed subjects access to the adjacent cage. In this condition, maximizing the pay-off required the subject to pay attention to trays on its side as well as on the other side, understand how trays moved and avoid natural impulses to pick always the closest and highest quantities in order to choose the maximizing option (e.g., 5/3, obtaining 8, rather than 6/0, obtaining 6, see open door conditions in Table 1 ). Table 1 shows how subjects could vary their choices depending on the state of the door to prove their understanding of the game. In each session, one given condition was played during three nonconsecutive trials. Chimpanzees played alone and passed the training when they chose the maximizing option at least in 80% of the trials per condition. We counterbalanced the order of the conditions, the sides of each option, and the room where the actor played.
Each dyad played both UG and DG. Each game consisted of eight sessions, 12 trials per session. The proposer and recipient roles alternated from trial to trial (e.g., in Trial 1, the Condition 6/0 and 6/3 is played; Alex plays as proposer and Jahaga, as recipient; in Trial 2, the condition is maintained, but Alex is the recipient and Jahaga, the proposer). Therefore, to analyze reciprocity, we measured whether dyads matched their choices in each pair of reciprocal trials and whether this remained constant across sessions. The order of the games was counterbalanced across dyads (i.e., ABACA or ACABA). Every trial started with the experimenter placing the food out of sight from the participants. When the proposer chimpanzee chose one option, in DG, both players got access to the food immediately (Figure 1a) , whereas in UG, the experimenter waited for 15 s for the recipient to pull from the Velcro (Figure 1b) . If the recipient did not pull, the food was removed. Regardless of rejection or acceptance, the intertrial interval remained constant.
Analysis
We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM; Baayen, 2008; R Core Team, 2016) with binomial error structure and logit link function to analyze subjects' choices (see Table 2 for an overview of the fitted models). When subjects delivered food to the opposite side, we scored 1, otherwise we scored 0. We also examined when recipients in the UG rejected offers and whether the offer in the previous trial (or the average offer in the previous session) affected the offer of the prior recipient in the current trial (short-term reciprocity). We examined the effect of communicative attempts between proposers and recipients. We coded two behaviors: "pointing," if the subjects placed their index finger or their hand through the decision window for more than 3 s, and "interaction," when the subjects touched or passed objects to each other through the mesh. We analyzed the two different responses separately. To examine whether they performed any of these responses at different rates in each social game, we used the Proposer Recipient 6/0 and 6/3 6/3 6/0 and 6/3 Chance 6/0 and 6/3 No cost Small gift 6/0 and 5/3 5/3 6/0 and 5/3 6/0 6/0 and 5/3 Cost Small gift 6/0 and 5/9 5/9 6/0 and 6/9 Chance 6/0 and 6/9 No cost Large gift 0/0 and 0/3 0/3 6/0 and 5/0 6/0 6/0 and 5/9 Cost Large gift
Note. Quantities used in nonsocial (door open/door closed) and social games. Depicted are the outcomes in each nonsocial condition based on a maximizing outcome. We also provide the labels of each pair of options used in social games to illustrate the factors assessed (cost for the proposer; gift for the recipient). UG ϭ ultimatum games; DG ϭ dictator games.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. frequency of these responses as dependent variables. Moreover, as pointing and interaction could enhance the probability of the proposer to deliver more food (i.e., choosing 6/3 instead of 6/0) or to incur a cost (i.e., choosing 5/3 instead of 6/0), we analyzed whether these communication attempts were related to the proposer's choice. For further information on the model specification, random effect structure, model stability and assumptions, see SI.
Results

Nonsocial Games (Training)
Figure 2 presents the proportion of trials in which chimpanzees playing alone selected the option that delivered food to the opposite side instead of the default 6/0 as a function of cost at the subject's side and door state. GLMM01 was significant compared with the null model (likelihood ratio test: 2 ϭ 105.58, df ϭ 6, p Ͻ .001). We only found a significant interaction between door and cost (estimate Ϯ SE: Ϫ1.00 Ϯ 0.29, 2 ϭ 11.77, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001; see Table S4 in the online supplemental materials). Post hoc tests revealed that chimpanzees maximized their payoffs in the cost condition when the door was open and they could gain access to 5 ϩ 3 pieces of food than when it was closed and they would only get five pieces (1.35 Ϯ 0.21, 2 ϭ 44.69, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001). In the no cost condition, subjects' choices were not significantly affected by the door state (0.35 Ϯ 0.21, 2 ϭ 2.87, df ϭ 1, p ϭ .090). Moreover, subjects preferentially selected 6/0 over 5/0 (80.1%, T ϩ ϭ 21, N ϭ 6, p ϭ .031) when the door was closed and 0/3 over 0/0 (97.2%, T ϩ ϭ 21, N ϭ 6, p ϭ .031) when it was open (see SI for additional analyses). Taken together, these results provide evidence that subjects paid attention to the quantities on their side and on their partner's side. Furthermore, they adjusted their choices to the state of the door to maximize their outcome. Figure 3 presents the proportion of trials in which chimpanzees selected the options that delivered food to their partner's side (compared with the default 6/0 option) as a function of game, cost, and gift. GLMM02 (see SI) was significant compared with the null model ( 2 ϭ 82.01, df ϭ 8, p Ͻ .001); however we found no significant interactions (all p Ͼ .1).
Social Games
A reduced model without the two-way interactions was significant compared with the null model ( 2 ϭ 76.93, df ϭ 5, p Ͻ .001; see Table S5 in the online supplemental materials). Subjects were more willing to deliver food to the partner when there was no cost (Ϫ1.11 Ϯ 0.16, 2 ϭ 52.96, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001) and when the gift for the partner was large (Ϫ0.63 Ϯ 0.16, 2 ϭ 16.91, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001). Moreover, the likelihood to deliver food to the partner decreased over sessions (Ϫ0.18 Ϯ 0.08, 2 ϭ 5.66, df ϭ 1, p ϭ .017). There was no significant difference between the games (Ϫ0.24 Ϯ 0.15, 2 ϭ 2.37, df ϭ 1, p ϭ .124) or a significant main effect of trial number (Ϫ0.007 Ϯ 0.08, 2 ϭ 0.008, df ϭ 1, p ϭ This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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.930). Taken together, these results show that chimpanzees played DG and UG in a similar way. They delivered food to their partners predominantly when this did not entail a cost for them, but they were also more generous with larger amounts of food for the partner. Figure 4 presents the proportion of trials in which chimpanzees selected the option that delivered food to their partner's side as a function of game and proposer's cost. We compared the social games and the nonsocial training (door-closed condition; data pooled across the training phases because our analyses had shown that performance remained unchanged throughout training phases, see SI). GLMM03 was significant compared with the null model ( 2 ϭ 98.56, df ϭ 3, p Ͻ .001; see Table S6 in the online supplemental materials). Proposers were more willing to deliver food to the other side when there was no cost for them (Ϫ1.40 Ϯ 0.15, 2 ϭ 92.63, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001). We found a significant effect of game ( 2 ϭ 6.72, df ϭ 2, p ϭ .035), specifically; subjects delivered more food to the other side in DG compared to the nonsocial training (0.43 Ϯ 0.19, z ϭ 2.33, p ϭ .020) but not between the UG and training (Ϫ0.06 Ϯ 0.19, z ϭ Ϫ0.34, p ϭ .736). Consequently, chimpanzees only chose the prosocial options significantly more often when there was no cost associated with it in the DG compared with when they played alone.
We also analyzed the two games separately. In both the UG and DG, proposers were significantly more willing to deliver food to the partner when they incurred no cost (UG: Ϫ0.91 Ϯ 0.22, 2 ϭ 17.69, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001; DG: Ϫ1.33 Ϯ 0.28, 2 ϭ 8.27, df ϭ 1, p ϭ .004). In the UG, this happened also when the gift for the partner was large (0.88 Ϯ 0.22, 2 ϭ 16.52, df ϭ 1, p Ͻ .001). In contrast, no significant effect of gift was found in DG (0.39 Ϯ 0.22, 2 ϭ 3.16, df ϭ 1, p ϭ .076). Moreover, in UG proposers became less inclined to deliver food across sessions (Ϫ0.26 Ϯ 0.11, 2 ϭ 5.82, df ϭ 1, p ϭ .016). Thus, in both games, chimpanzee proposers paid attention to the cost. They seemed to pay attention to the gift for the partner particularly in UG, although they decreased the food delivery over sessions.
Ultimatum Game: Acceptance Rates
Recipients accepted all offers above zero, whereas zero offers were accepted in 58.3 Ϯ 7.1% of trials. GLMM04 was not significant compared with the null-model ( 2 ϭ 8.09, df ϭ 5, p ϭ .151), neither was a reduced without the interaction ( 2 ϭ 6.89, df ϭ 4, p ϭ .142).
Reciprocity
Except for a male-male dyad in which one subject reciprocated prosocial offers (see Tables S9 and S10 and Figure S2 in the online supplemental materials), we found no evidence for short-term reciprocity: Neither the offers in the previous trial (GLMM05) nor the average offers in the previous session (GLMM06) had a significant effect on performance.
Communication
All recipients except one sometimes pointed to a preferred option in the social games (13.4 Ϯ 5.2% of all trials, range: 0%-42.7%). Recipients usually pointed before the proposers had chosen (98.0 Ϯ 1.7% of pointing trials). We found no evidence for a significant difference in pointing frequencies between the UG (M Ϯ SE: 22.0 Ϯ 7.8%) and DG (8.6 Ϯ 4.4%; see Table S13 in the online supplemental materials and GLMM07 in the SI). We found no evidence that pointing changed the likelihood of the proposers Figure 3 . Proportion of trials (M Ϯ SE) in which chimpanzees preferred the option that delivered food to their partner's side over the default 6/0 option as a function of game (DG, UG), size of the gift for the partner (x/9 vs. x/3), and cost at the subject's side (cost: 5/x; no cost: 6/x).
‫ء‬ denotes significant deviations from the hypothetical chance level (dashed line), p Ͻ .05, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
6 providing food for the recipients (GLMM08, see Table S14 in the online supplemental materials). Direct interactions between participants occurred only 34 times (5.9% of all trials). Twenty-nine of these interactions occurred in the UG and five in DG. Due to the small number of instances, we could not analyze whether there was a significant effect of these interactions on the proposer's performance.
Discussion
We tested chimpanzees using an iterated UG/DG protocol. Unlike humans, chimpanzee responders behaved as rational maximizers, invariably accepting offers larger than zero, something that is inconsistent with advantageous or disadvantageous inequity aversion, at least in the context of bargaining games and bearing in mind that our study does not cover all the aspects typically addressed in studies with adult humans. This is a very strong finding that has now been replicated in three other studies (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor et al., 2013) . Similarly to Jensen and colleagues' study (2007) , chimpanzees accepted more than half of the zero offers. It has been argued that such high acceptance rates might indicate poor understanding of the task (Brosnan, 2013) . However, we have provided robust and stable evidence of subjects' understanding of the contingencies of the game, which required paying attention to (a) the quantities on their side, (b) the opposite side, and (c) the consequences of choosing between the two options available. Another explanation for the lack of rational maximization is that long delays to reject may increase "false" acceptances to make a new trial start (Smith & Silberberg, 2010) . However, this explanation is unlikely because we reduced the rejection period to 15 s (lower than 60 s in the study by Jensen et al., 2007 and 30 s in the study by Proctor et al., 2013) and kept the time between trials constant. Thus, as Henrich and Silk (2013b) argued, in a game where both accepting and rejecting a zero option invariably leads to a zero outcome, rejections may occur at chance (in accordance with our results) and still be compatible with rational maximization.
Proposers provided more food to conspecifics in the DG than when they played alone. In fact, such prosocial offers resemble those made by humans in the same game and are also in line with the change of preferences to offer more in social rather than nonsocial conditions of Proctor and colleagues' study (2013) . However, proposers offered the same in the UG regardless of the presence of the partner, which differs from Proctor et al.'s (2013) study, where proposers offered more than expected in an UG. Such finding is puzzling from the point of view of classical economics. Brosnan and de Waal (2014) suggested that prosociality or anticipatory avoidance of conflict could explain this result. However, some methodological concerns made these explanations contentious. The absence of rejections might be due to the presence of a begging experimenter as well as to the fact that "neither species was explicitly trained that refusal was an option" (Proctor et al., 2013) .
Provided the proposers in our study preferred not incurring costs to be prosocial, this suggests some evidence of calculated prosociality. Probably, the proposer first and foremost focused on her own payoffs and secondarily on her partner's. Interestingly, proposers did not offer more in the UG than the DG, as would have been expected for the sake of avoiding rejections. Perhaps the recipients' behavior can explain this outcome. Although human proposers face high risk of rejection, chimpanzee proposers do not, given the high acceptance rate of their conspecifics. Responders accepting half of the time do not force proposers to be generous, as any selfish offer is likely to be accepted at least half of the time. This would justify the significant decrement of prosocial offers in UG, but it would not explain doing so also at no cost. One explanation might be that proposers facing a rejection of a selfish option would not be willing to reward the partner with food in a future trial and persist in offering less and less food. This decreas- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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ing offers are compatible with punishing the recipient for rejecting instead of rewarding the recipient to make him more willing to accept. If that was the case, chimpanzee proposers would not show signs of second-order inequity aversion after the recipients' refusals, contrary to previous interpretations (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014) , but a lack of strategic behavior characteristic of human proposers' performance. Despite large methodological differences, the four studies conducted so far (Jensen et al., 2007; Kaiser et al., 2012; Proctor et al., 2013 ; and the present one) have consistently shown that chimpanzees seem to differ when they play UG and DG, suggesting a divergent evolutionary pathway in the consideration of fairness. It is especially remarkable that no ape had rejected any offer different from zero so far. Kaiser and colleagues (Kaiser et al., 2012) argued that chimpanzee recipients in these games may not interpret a low offer as unfair. Although chimpanzees share food routinely, they did not usually offer food to each other (Gilby, 2006) , so perhaps any offer is surprising, and thus no unfairness is perceived. In contrast to humans, where the majority of cultures impose some kind of justice that is likely to be claimed and to cause rejections if not accomplished, nonhuman primates do not seem to possess an agreement on how to split windfall resources. Hence, rejections are probably only present in societies which define themselves as a community with some agreement on abstract entitlements among its members (which may explain why humans are more likely to reject a low offer from another human but not from a computer (Blount, 1995) . One could argue that we would have obtained different results if we had used much more valuable or much larger rewards. However, due to their natural occurrence, we would argue that smaller rather than very large windfalls are likely to be more common on a daily basis and, consequently, more relevant.
The virtual absence of rejections in the UG has also to be squared off with the seemingly contradictory results from other studies with nonhuman primates. For instance, a task that required the same effort from pairs of individuals but rewarded them differentially fostered rejection in capuchin monkeys (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Silberberg, Crescimbene, Addessi, Anderson, & Visalberghi, 2009) . Why did capuchin monkeys reject food in that study and chimpanzees did not when playing the UG? Windfall resources are not common in nature, but effortful activities (e.g., hunting and foraging) are. Thus, nonhuman primates may consider merit rather than equality as a measuring rod for fairness, making deservingness comparable to something factual rather than to something abstract. Therefore, to obtain a deeper understanding of nonhuman primates' concept of fairness and force proposers to face the risk of a potential rejection, novel tasks with factual comparisons, such as different labor investments, are required.
Communication and establishing turn taking is one way by which human children manage to split windfalls equally in coordination games (Grüneisen, 2015; Sánchez-Amaro, Duguid, Call, & Tomasello, 2016) . We found no evidence that communication or reciprocity fostered a more equitable distribution of payoffs, in accordance to previous findings (Vonk et al., 2008) . However, it is interesting to note that in our study, only recipients (except for one single occasion) emitted pointing gestures to their proposer partners because pointing is usually reported between human experimenters and captive nonhuman primates (up to 71% of captive chimpanzees pointed to unreachable food in Leaven's studies (Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 2005) rather than between conspecifics (Itakura, 1996) . In our case, pointing did not significantly alter the proposers' subsequent actions, but it seems clear that chimpanzee responders were trying to use some way of local enhancement that was inefficiently understood by proposers, as was previously reported in a similar proposer/recipient design (Silk et al., 2005) . It is unlikely that chimpanzee responders in our study were trying to reach the food because they did not point when the proposer was absent. Therefore, it seems that even when chimpanzees individually use pointing as a referential gesture to humans, they find difficulties to transfer the same meaning within their species, as if response to pointing was very limited between species. It might happen that proposers do not perceive themselves as the addressee of such communication (however, see orangutans' performance on referential pointing plus a discussion about the inferences required to comprehend pointing, Moore, Call, & Tomasello, 2015) .
Conclusions
In conclusion, our results are compatible with the existence of intrinsic (although noncostly) prosociality and rational maximization behavior but provide no evidence of inequity aversion. There were no signs of reciprocity, and proposers did not change their behavior even if it led to rejection (contrary to the strategic behavior characteristic of human proposers' performance). These findings suggest that prosociality, inequity aversion, and strategic behavior might have followed different evolutionary pathways in the two species.
